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A B R A M  L . H A R R IS
ECONOM IC EVOLUTION: D IA LE C TIC A L AND 
D ARW IN IAN
T
HE contribution of Thorstein Veblen to economic thought 
bears a striking resemblance to the body of doctrine elabo­
rated by Karl Marx. This resemblance can be seen, for 
example, in the correspondence between their theories or ex­
planations of economic change and development. The one, his­
torical materialism, was developed by Marx on the basis of the 
Hegelian dialectic, while the other, institutional mutationism, was 
originated by Veblen from the Darwinian principles of variation, 
selection, and survival. Although the postulates underlying the 
two theories differ and operate through diverse mechanics of 
change, they perform similar functions in the two. systems and 
lead to corresponding social philosophies. Their first and perhaps 
more important function consists in furnishing the criteria for 
judging the phenomenon of capitalism as a system of productive 
efficiency and, at the same time, for evaluating that body of 
knowledge in which capitalism finds theoretical justification. 
Since it is in terms of these postulates that the merits of capital­
ism and the ends it serves are weighed, both historical materialism 
and institutional mutationism are actually involved with a larger 
and decidedly philosophical problem, that of the theory of value 
from the standpoint of social morality.1 A  discussion of the con-
1 This is readily recognized in the case of Marx. While not so obvious it is equally 
true of Veblen. Neither Marx nor Veblen could avoid making value-judgments and 
at the same time attempt a critique of capitalist economy. It is well to recall in this 
connection Veblen’s words: “ Whatever is, is clearly at one and the same time, both 
right and wrong.”  {Journal of Political Economy, VIII, No. i [December, 1899], 
n o.) Besides, historical materialism and institutional mutationism are theories of 
progress. Progress in the sociological sense is not simply a matter of biological 
change, or what Veblen, hiding behind a fictitious apathy of scientific detachment, 
would call non-purposive change in accordance with “ opaque cause and effect.”  
Progress is change for the better; “ an increase, in the course of time, of the value of 
life, whatever that may be.” (R. B. Perry, Moral Economy [New York, 1909], 
p. 126.) When, therefore Veblen bases progress or change upon economic arrange­
ments and then makes the “ survival” of these arrangements depend upon their 
“ fitness” for the purposes of life he is doing nothing less than formulating the basis
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siderations that grow out of this function transcends the scope of 
the present paper which will be confined to a discussion of those 
that grow out of the second function. This function performed by 
these respective postulates is that of constituting the causal norms 
which are conceived as the standards in terms of which economic 
institutions evolve and shape the course and character of the rest 
of cultural development.
I
TECHNOLOGY, CLASS STRUGGLE, AND OCCUPATIONAL 
DISCIPLINE
At the outset it should be stated that neither the Marxian nor 
the Veblenian interpretation is accepted here as a technological 
explanation of culture, if by technology is meant the mechanical 
arts. Even if technology is defined more broadly so as to mean the 
“ organization of productive forces,” as might be done in the case 
of Veblen, the Marxian materialistic conception cannot be called a 
technological explanation without seriously distorting its essen­
tially dialectical and class-struggle character. Y et this technolog­
ical explanation has found acceptance among a number of econo­
mists whose judgment can hardly be overlooked. In Europe it has 
been championed by Professor Werner Sombart,* 2 and in this 
country by Professor Alvin Hansen.3 It is undeniable that numer­
of a value-judgment. Moreover, when he makes mechanical efficiency the test of 
survival, it is clear that he means efficiency as measured by hutnan welfare, or to use 
his own words, “ facility of life.” (See Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class [New 
York, 1931], pp. 194-95.) The “ facility of life” afforded by an economic organiza­
tion turns upon abundance or scarcity of goods which involves the question of wants 
which again involves the problem of ethical or economic evaluation.
2 See Mandell M. Bober, Karl Marx’s Economic Interpretation of History (Cam­
bridge, 1927), chaps, i and ii. Also, Sidney Hook’s recently published, Towards the 
Understanding of Karl Marx (New York, 1933) chap. xii. The present essay was 
written and submitted for publication before the author had read Dr. Hook’s analy­
sis.
3 See Alvin H. Hansen, “ The Technological Interpretation of History,”  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, X X X V I, 72 ff. In a recent and larger work Professor Hansen 
places as much emphasis upon “ class” factors as he does upon technology. “ No one 
doubts,” he states, “ that the rise in the standard of living of all European peoples in 
the last hundred years was the result fundamentally of the Industrial Revolution, 
of the advance of science and the development of improved techniques. Yet this
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ous passages from Marx, cited for example by Professor Hansen 
do lend credence to the technological argument. But any doubt 
about Marx’s attempt to explain history by anything but class 
struggle as determined by the property relations governing in­
come and production ought to be dispelled by his famous words in 
the opening paragraph of the Communist Manifesto.
T he history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. 
Freeman and slave, patrician and plebian, lord and serf, guild-master and 
journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant op­
position to one another, carried on uninterrupted, now hidden, now open 
fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of 
society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.4
This struggle as it manifests itself in modern society is not de­
termined by the character of tools, but by the capitalistic employ­
ment of them.5 The control of the means of production is not an 
end in itself but rather the means of controlling the social surplus.6 
The surplus, of course, is large or small in proportion to techno­
logical development.7 While Marx looked upon tools, and like-
revolutionary change in the method of production necessitated a remodeling of social 
institutions..........Part of our difficulties are caused by the lag in institutional ad­
justments. These adjustments come partly (perhaps chiefly) out of changes in the 
balance of power between groups or classes (as Marx had it), and partly out of the 
application of science to the field of social institutions.” Hansen, Economic Stabiliza­
tion in an Unbalanced World (New York, 1932), p. 360.
4 “ The Communist Manifesto” in The Essentials of Marx (edited by Algernon 
Lee [New York, 1926], p. 31). All other citations are from this edition of the Mani­
festo.
s “ Since therefore machinery, considered alone, shortens the hours of labor, but, 
when in the service of capital, lengthens them . . . .  since in itself it is a victory of 
man over the forces of nature, but in the hands of capital, makes man the slave of 
those forces; since in itself it increases the wealth of the producers, but in the hands 
of capital, makes them paupers— for all these reasons and others besides, says the 
bourgeois economist without more ado, it is clear as noon day that all these contra­
dictions are a mere semblance of the reality, and that, as a matter of fact, they have 
neither an actual nor a theoretical existence. Thus he saves himself from all further 
puzzling of the brain, and what is more, implicitly declares his opponent to be stupid 
enough to contend against, not the capitalistic employment of machinery, but 
machinery itself.” Marx, Capital (Kerr edition, Chicago, 1906), I, 482.
6 That the class struggle ultimately centers around the control of the social sur­
plus seems to be substantiated by Marx’s untranslated Theorien uber den Mehrwert 
(edited by Karl Kautsky, Stuttgart, 1905).
7 “ The productiveness of labour depends not only on the proficiency of the work­
man, but on the perfection of his tools.”  Marx, Capital, I, 374. Also see p. 200, esp. 
n. 2.
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wise the natural environment, as the indispensable basis of the 
labor process, he takes the latter as the physical basis of that 
process and the former as a limiting condition. He states that 
“ the elementary factors of the labor-process are (i), the personal 
activity of man, i.e., work itself, (2), the subject of that work, and 
(3), its instruments...........As the earth is his [man's] original lard­
er, so too it is his original tool house...........The earth itself is an
instrument of labor, but when used as such in agriculture implies 
a whole series of other instruments and a comparatively high de­
velopment of labor."8 The manner in which the labor process 
is limited by technology and physical environment Marx describes 
as follows:
It  is not the tropics with their luxuriant vegetation, but the temperate 
zone, that is the mother country of capital. It  is not the mere fertility  of the 
soil, but the differentiation of the soil, the variety of its natural products, 
the changes of the seasons, which form the physical basis for the social divi­
sion of labour, and which, by  changes in the natural surroundings, spur man on 
to the multiplication of his wants, his capabilities, his means and modes of 
labour...........Favorable natural conditions alone, gave us only the possi­
bility, never the reality, of surplus-labour, nor, consequently, of surplus-value 
and a surplus-product. T he result of difference in the natural conditions of 
labour is this, that the same quantity of labour satisfies, in different countries, 
a different mass of requirements, consequently, that under circumstances in 
other respects analogous, the necessary labour-time is different. These con­
ditions affect surplus-labour only as natural limits, i.e., by  fixing the points at 
which labour for others can begin .9
The labor process, then, whatever its technological means or its 
physical limitations, is always the attempt of man to wring satis­
factions from nature. It is not technology or physical environ­
ment but the “ social conditions" under which the labor process is 
conducted that reveal the nature of society.
The labour process, resolved as above into its simple elem entary factors, 
is human action with a view  to the production of use values, appropriation 
of natural substances to human requirements; it is the necessary condition 
for effecting exchange of m atter between man and N ature; it is the everlast­
ing nature-imposed condition of human existence, and therefore is independ­
ent of every social phase of that existence, or rather, is common to every 
such phase...........As the taste of the porridge does not tell you who grew the
8 Marx, Capital, I, 198-99. 9 Ibid., I , 563-65*
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oats, no more does this simple process tell you of itself w hat are the social 
conditions under which it is taking place, whether under the slave-owner’s 
brutal lash, or the anxious eye of the capitalist, whether Cincinnatus carries 
it on in tilling his modest farm or a savage in killing wild animals with stones.10
While techpological means indicate the “ degree of development 
to which human labor has attained” and “ the social conditions 
under which that labor is carried on/’11 they do not determine 
these social conditions.12 The latter are determined by the modes 
of production, distribution, and exchange. But “modes” of pro­
duction should not be confused with “ means” of production. It is 
from such a confusion that the technological argument arises. 
Marx’s description of the “ labor process” serves him as the basis 
for his theories of surplus value and exploitation. In this descrip­
tion he develops the thesis that both capital goods and consumers’ 
goods originate in the “ labor process.” 13 Tools are therefore noth­
ing but stored up labor.14 It is only under certain conditions that 
these tools become capital.
10 Ibid., pp. 204-5.
11 Ibid., p. 200. Also note Marx’s statement that “ Technology discloses man’s 
mode of dealing with nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life, 
and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social relations, and of the 
mental conceptions that flow from them.”  Ibid., p. 406, n. 2.
12 “ Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange, and 
of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of 
exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the 
nether world whom he has called up by his spells. For many a decade past, the his­
tory of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive 
forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that 
are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeoisie and of its rule.”  Marx, the 
Communist Manifesto, p. 36.
13 “ Since past labour always disguises itself as capital, i.e., since the passive of the 
labour of A, B, C, etc., takes the form of the active of the non-labourer X , bourgeois 
and political economists are full of praises of the services of dead and gone labour, 
which, according to the Scotch genius M ’Culloch, ought to receive a special re­
muneration in the shape of interest, profit, etc. The powerful and ever-increasing 
assistance given by past labour to the living labour process under the form of means 
of production, is therefore, attributed to that form of past labour in which it is 
alienated, as unpaid labour, from the worker himself, i.e., to its capitalistic form.” 
Marx, Capital, I, 666-67.
14 “ We know that the means of production and subsistence, while they remain 
the property of the immediate producer, are not capital. They become capital, only 
under circumstances in which they serve at the same time as means of exploitation 
and subjection of the labourer.”  Ibid., p. 840.
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T he conditions which generally govern production must be differentiated 
in order that the essential points of difference be not lost sight of in view  of 
the general uniformity which is due to the fact that the subject, mankind, and 
the object, nature, remain the same. T he failure to remember this one fact is 
the source of all the wisdom of modern economists who are trying to prove 
the eternal nature and harmony of existing social conditions. Thus they 
say, e.g., that no production is possible without some instrument of production, 
let that instrument be only the hand; that none is possible without past ac­
cumulated labor, even i f  that labor consist of mere skill which has been accumu­
lated and concentrated in the hand of the savage b y  repeated exercise. Capital 
is, among other things, also an instrument of production, also past imper­
sonal labor. Hence, capital is a universal, eternal natural phenomenon; 
which is true if we disregard the specific properties which turn an “ instru­
ment of production”  and “ stored up labor”  into capital.1*
The conditions which turn an “ instrument of production” into 
capital arise from the institutions of property and competitive ex­
change. Under these conditions “ capital is not a thing” but “ a so­
cial relation between persons, established by the instrumentality 
of things.” 16 Only as capital do the means of production become 
the condition whereby human labor is exploited and its products 
appropriated.17 Against this subordination and exploitation hu­
man labor persistently revolts. The revolt is ostensibly a struggle 
between classes for the control of the means of production and 
subsistence. In its more fundamental sense it is a struggle for the 
control of the social surplus which, as will be noted later, begets 
social power and political authority.
js Marx, Critique of Political Economy (Kerr edition, Chicago, 1904), pp. 269-70. 
(Italics mine.)
16 Capital, I, 839. Elsewhere Marx states: “ Now capital also is a social relation 
of production. It is a bourgeois relation of production, a condition of production of 
a bourgeois society. Are not the means of subsistence, the implements of labor, and 
the raw material, of which capital consists, the results of definite social relations; 
were they not produced and stored up under certain social conditions? Will they 
not be used for further production under certain social conditions within definite 
social relations? And is it not just this definite social character that transforms into 
capital that product which serves for further production?” “ Wage Labor and 
Capital,” in Lee, op. cit., p. 94.
*7 “ The contest between the capitalist and the wage-labourer dates back to the 
very origin of capital. It raged on throughout the whole manufacturing period. But 
only since the introduction of machinery has the workman fought against the instru­
ment of labor itself, the material embodiment of capital. He revolts against this par­
ticular form of the means of production, as being the material basis of the capitalist 
mode of production.”  Marx, Capital, I, 466-67. (Italics mine.)
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In our later discussion of the postulates of Marxian evolution, 
it will be shown that this struggle for the control of the social sur­
plus has two meanings. One is the absolute or real and the other 
the relative or phenomenal. From the absolute standpoint the 
class struggle symbolizes the effort of human labor to emancipate 
itself from subordination to its products; it is the attempt of labor 
to realize a socio-ethical position consonant with its productive 
function.18 In the absolute sense there are no separate and dis­
tinct class struggles. There is only a succession of revolts which 
we distinguish as peculiar to a given epoch but which in actuality 
constitute one indivisible historical phenomenon. From the sec­
ond or relative standpoint, class struggles differ in particular peri­
ods because the method of appropriating the social surplus differs 
in different periods. In consequence, the specific character of so­
ciety and the state in a given period of history differs, being de­
termined by the peculiar way in which the social surplus of that 
period is appropriated.
T he specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus labor is pumped out 
of the direct producers, determines the relation of rulers and ruled, as it grows 
im m ediately out of production itself and re-acts upon it as a determining 
element. Upon this is founded the entire formation of the economic com­
m unity which grows up out of the conditions of production itself, and this 
also determines its specific political shape. It  is always the direct relation of 
the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers, which 
reveals the innermost secret, the hidden foundation of the entire social con­
struction, and with it of the political form of the relations between sover­
eignty and dependence, in short, of the corresponding form of the state. 
T he form of this relation between rulers and ruled naturally corresponds 
always with a definite stage in the development of the methods of labor and 
of its productive social power. T his does not prevent the same economic
18 Professor Perlman has given a similar interpretation of the class struggle in his 
analysis of the labor movement. He states: “ While the concept of labor as a ‘mass’ in 
the grip of a ‘force’ is the common basis of all intellectualist theories of the labor 
movement, intellectuals fall into three distinct groupings, depending on what they 
take the nature of that ‘force’ to be. The Marxian, who is a ‘determinist-revolu- 
tionary,’ pictures it as the ever growing force of material production, embodied in 
the tools of production and in technological methods. This ‘force,’ in seeking to 
break through the capitalist strait jacket which encases it and impedes its further 
growth, is inevitably hurling the labor ‘mass’ against the political and legal regime 
established and defended by the capitalist class.” Selig Perlman, A Theory of the 
Labor Movement (New York, 1928), p. 282.
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basis from showing infinite variations and gradations in its appearance, 
even though its principal conditions are everywhere the same. T his is due 
to innumerable outside circumstances, natural environment, race peculiari­
ties, outside historical influences, and so forth, all of which must be ascer­
tained by careful analysis.19
It might be argued that when technology is looked upon as em­
bracing both the mechanical and the non-mechanical arts of a 
given society no essential harm is done to the Marxian interpreta­
tion by calling it technological. For when used in this sense it is 
synonymous with “mode of production.” Even so, it is not the 
“mode of production” which of itself produces conflict according 
to Marx, but the consciousness aroused in social classes by their 
opposing productive and distributive relations under the institu­
tion of private property. Therefore the economic pressure, which 
according to the Marxian materialistic conception determines the 
character of the social order at any given time, thereby shaping 
the course of history, is not the disciplinary effect of changing 
techniques upon social habits, but rather the impact of income 
upon the fortunes of social classes under changing conditions of 
production.20 When this economic pressure is envisaged as tech­
nological exigencies the nature of its impact must be shifted from 
income to the discipline of workmanship or of industrial efficiency. 
That such a rendition of Marx’s interpretation distorts the char­
acter of its inner drives is readily seen from a cursory examination 
of the revolutionary motives attributed by him to the modern 
proletariat. Although it is permissible to reason that since Marx 
held the proletariat (labor) to be the source of creative effort and, 
therefore, of industrial efficiency, it would be wholly incorrect to 
conclude that he saw this function as vocational activity which
19 Capital, III, 919.
20 “ Marx,” states Engels, “ was the first to discover the great law which governs 
the march of history. According to this law, all historical struggles, although they 
seem to take place on the political, religious, philosophical, or any other ideal plane, 
are, in reality, nothing else than the more or less clear expression of struggles be­
tween social classes. The existence of these classes and their collisions, are them­
selves determined by the degree of development in the economic situation, by the 
prevailing mode of production, and by the methods of exchange which result. This 
law bears the same relationship to history as the law of the conservation of energy 
bears towards the physical sciences.”  Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 
(Eden and Cedar Paul, tr.; New York, 1926), p. 22. Also see p. 7.
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in the form of occupational discipline determines the class animus 
and the revolutionary motives of the proletariat. What he main­
tained was that the revolutionary motives and will of the prole­
tariat result from its growing consciousness of the increasing dis­
parity between its importance as the source of productive efficien­
cy and the value of its economic and social rewards. Industrial 
efficiency never comes in as a major force or as the criterion of in­
stitutional utility in the Marxian system.
It is in Veblen’s scheme of economic evolution that industrial 
efficiency plays the decisive role. Indeed one of Veblen’s chief 
criticisms against Marxian materialism is that it assumes that 
economic pressure takes the form of “ output” or income rather 
than productive efficiency. Thus he contends that
The class struggle is conceived to be “ m aterial,”  but the term “ m aterial”  
is in this connection used in a metaphorical sense. It  does not mean me­
chanical or physical, or even physiological, but economic. It  is m aterial in 
the sense that it is a struggle between classes for the material means of life. 
. . . .  T he dialectic of the movement of social progress, therefore, moves on 
the spiritual plane of human desire and passion, not on the (literally) m a­
terial plane of mechanical and physiological stress, on which the develop­
m ental process of brute creation unfolds itself. It  is a sublimated m aterial­
ism, sublimated by the dominating presence of the conscious human sp irit; 
but it is conditioned by the m aterial facts of the production of the means of 
life.21
In a previous essay,22 it was stated that while Veblen accepted 
a materialistic explanation of history he denied that materialistic 
factors exert their effect through the dialectics of class struggle. 
But in the quotation given in the preceding paragraph it will be 
noticed that Veblen places “ mechanical” and “ physiological” in 
opposition to “ economic.” The logical inference of this implicit 
distinction is that if he accepted a materialistic interpretation of 
history23 his material factors are evidently of a different order
21 Veblen, The Place of Science in Modern Civilization (New York, 1930), p. 415.
22 Abram L. Harris, “ Types of Institutionalism,”  Journal of Political Economy, 
December, 1932, pp. 721 ff.
23 Speaking of the conditions making for change in the United States, Veblen 
states: “ As is always the case, in the nature of things, so in this case, too, the changes 
that have taken effect in the material circumstances are the creative factors which 
have gone into action, as a driving force and a controlling agency, and have set afoot 
a new line of habituation.”  Absentee Ownership (New York, 1923), p. 206.
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from those of Marx. There are, indeed, two respects in which Veb- 
len’s material factors differ from those of Marx: first, in the way 
they exert their influence upon the course of human affairs; and, 
secondly, in their qualitative characteristics. An examination of 
the institutional conflict that Veblen finds peculiar to Western 
civilization will assist in distinguishing his material factors in 
these respects. According to Veblen:
. . . .  Secular life among the peoples of Christendom is governed in re­
cent times by  three several systems of use and wont, sovereign action-pat­
terns induced by the run of past habituation:— the mechanical system of 
industry; the price-system ;24 and the national establishment. T he existing 
industrial system  is dominated b y  the technology of physics and chemistry, 
and is a product of recent times, a profoundly modified derivative of the 
handicraft industry. T he current price-system is dominated by absentee 
ownership and is also a greatly altered outgrowth of the handicraft industry 
and its p etty  trade; its continued growth in recent times has, in effect, 
changed it into a credit-price system. T he nation, considered as a habit of 
thought, is a residual form of the predatory dynastic State of early modern 
times, superficially altered b y  a suffusion of democratic and parliam entary 
institutions in recent times.25
The oldest of these institutions is the state, but running closely 
behind it is business enterprise. The mechanical system of indus­
try is the newest institution. While both the state and business 
enterprise rest upon industry for material support, the latter, 
from the standpoint of the norms of conduct and knowledge en­
forced by its discipline, is most alien to the other two.26 On the 
other hand, the points of coincidence between the state and busi­
ness are very close. Although not identical in aim these two insti­
tutions have come to fortify each other.
T he state, that is to say, the government, was once an organization for 
the control of affairs in the interest of princely or dynastic ends. In internal 
affairs statecraft was occupied w ith questions of the dynastic succession, 
the endeavors and intrigues of the political magnates, fiscal administration 
directed to finding adequate support for the princely power, and the like. 
In  external politics the objective end was dynastic prestige and security, 
m ilitary success, and the like. Such is still in part the end of political en-
24 Price system is used by Veblen as a correlative of business enterprise.
25 Absentee Ownership, p. 398.
36 The Theory of Business Enterprise (New York, 1904), p. 67, and pp. 302-3.
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deavor in those countries, as e.g., Germ any,2? Austria, or Ita ly , where the 
transition to a constitutional government has not been completed. B ut 
since the advent of constitutional government and parliam entary represen­
tation, business ends have taken the lead of dynastic ends in statecraft, very 
much in the same measure as the transition to constitutional methods has 
been effectually carried through. A  constitutional government is a business 
governm ent.28
The relation which Veblen thus posits between the modern 
state and business enterprise originated, in point of evolution, in 
the transition from feudalism and petty trade to modern com­
merce and industry, or to use familiar Marxian terminology, 
originated in the period that gave birth to the bourgeoisie. When 
Veblen argues this relationship between business ownership and 
the modern state from the vantage of psychology, he attempts to 
show that the genesis of it antedates the economic changes of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Since both the state and 
business enterprise are invidious institutions, their interrelation 
is rooted in the predatory dispositions of human nature whilst the 
non-invidious industrial system is the psychological expression of 
non-predatory traits of workmanship. In thus viewing this mod­
ern institutional conflict, psycho-genetically, he sees it as an age- 
old conflict between “ exploit” and “ industry,” a conflict that 
reaches back into those “ savage” and “ barbarian” cultures out of 
which Western civilization sprang.29 What Veblen seems to be 
saying is that not only modern culture but history itself is the re­
flection of a conflict between the habits of industry and exploita­
tion arising out of man’s struggle for existence in society. The eco­
nomic circumstances by which this conflict is crystallized are the 
prevailing technological scheme and the institution of private 
property. These circumstances lead to conflict not through a con­
sciousness of income differences between social classes but through 
the discipline they exercise over the habits of vocational classes. 
In other words, income and production under the governance of 
property relations are not the economic considerations by which
27 Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (New York, 1918), 
chaps, iii, v, and vii.
28 The Theory of Business Enterprise, p. 284. Also Absentee Ownership, p. 442.
29 The Theory of the Leisure Class, pp. 12-13.
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conflict is determined. Class interest and class division are deter­
mined by the discipline of the pecuniary and the industrial occu­
pations. These divergent types of occupations exercise different 
disciplines, thereby enforcing different habits and, as a conse­
quence, different outlooks and standards of judgment upon the 
mentality of the different classes who are habitually employed in 
them in making a living. Class antagonism is thus engendered by 
conflicting habits that arise from the discipline of ownership, on 
the one hand, and from that of workmanship, on the other, rather 
than by the impact of differential conditions of income and pro­
duction upon class fortunes. How the technological scheme and 
private property enforce different disciplines upon occupational 
classes and how they lead to a conflict in social habits will be seen 
from a necessarily abridged account of Veblen’s theories of private 
property and productive efficiency.
In the struggle for existence the “ material exigencies” encount­
ered by man in his physical environment are “ systematized” into 
“ the state of the industrial arts.”30 The state of the industrial arts 
arises out of man’s “ habitual material (industrial) occupations.” 
It comprises those “ technological expedients” employed by man to 
wring satisfactions from nature. These expedients are material 
and immaterial in character. In their material aspect they include 
“ tools, vessels, vehicles, raw materials, buildings, ditches, and 
. . . .  the land in use,” but likewise “ the useful minerals, plants 
and animals.”31 In their immaterial aspect they comprise a “ com­
mon stock of information and proficiency in the ways and means 
of life” which “ vests in the group at large.”32 These “ technologi­
cal expedients” that make up the state of the industrial arts there­
fore embody the industrial efficiency of a given community or cul­
ture. On the lower levels of culture the material contrivances 
necessary for gaining a living are slight and are usually in the 
workman’s possession.33 Here the free workman is the center or
3° The Place of Science, p. 44.
*xIbid., p. 329.
32 Ibid., pp. 325-26.
33 “ As determined by the state of the industrial arts in such a culture, the mem­
bers of the community co-operate in much of their work, to the common gain and to
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the controlling agent in economic relations; and man’s powers and 
functions in the industrial community are decided on grounds of 
workmanlike aptitude and special training.* 34 This state of “ free 
workmanship” is superseded by a pecuniary control of industry as 
soon as private property develops. Since individual ownership is 
a “ habit of thought” respecting “ surplus” wealth and the mate­
rial means for obtaining it, private property does not appear until 
adopted by some strategic class which subtly enforces it upon the 
community.35 On the lower levels of culture individual ownership 
first emerges from the “ parasitism” of magicians and priests.36 A 
further strengthening of the habit of ownership takes place with 
the “ advent of warfare” and “ the war chief.” Into the war chief’s 
hands “ authority and pecuniary emoluments gather somewhat in 
proportion as warlike exploits and ideals become habitual in the 
community. More or less of loot falls into the hands of the victors 
in any raid. The loot may be goods, cattle if any, or men, women, 
and children; any or all of which may become (private) property 
and be accumulated in sufficient mass to make a difference be­
tween rich and poor.”37 The appearance of the war lord also 
marks a transition of property rights from a spiritual (priestly) to 
a temporal (kingly) basis thus paving the way for the dynastic 
state and its later derivative, the democratic state.38 The institu­
no one’s detriment, since there is substantially no individual, or private, gain to be 
sought. There is substantially no bartering or hiring, though there is a recognised 
obligation in all members to lend a hand; and there is of course no price, as there is no 
property and no ownership, for the sufficient reason that the habits of life under 
these circumstances do not provoke such a habit of thought.” The Instinct of Work­
manship (New York, 1922), p. 142.
34 Ibid., p. 146. 36 Ibid., pp. 155-56.
3s Ibid., p. 157. 37 Ibid., p. 157.
38 “ In the last analysis the nation remains a predatory organism, in practical 
effect an association of persons moved by a community interest in getting something
for nothing by force and fraud..........It is a residual derivative of the predatory
dynastic State, and as such it still continues to be, in the last resort, an establish­
ment for the mobilisation of force and fraud as against the outside and for a penal­
ized subservience of its underlying population at home.......... In recent times, owing
to the latterday state of the industrial arts, this national pursuit of warlike and 
political ends has come to be a fairly single-minded chase after unearned income to be 
procured by intimidation and intrigue.”  Absentee Ownership, p. 442. Also The In ­
stinct of Workmanship, p. 159.
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tion of ownership does not come into existence, however, until the 
technological basis is ripe for it. This technological ripeness seems 
to coincide with the growing resort to “ indirect methods of pro­
duction” whereby it becomes advantageous for certain members 
to “ engross” the community’s industrial efficiency, and in conse­
quence, “ the usufruct of the industrial arts.”
Hereby the technological basis for a pecuniary control of industry is given, 
in that the “ roundabout process of production”  yields an income above the 
subsistence of the workmen engaged in it, and the m aterial equipment of 
appliances (crops, fruit-trees, live stock, mechanical contrivances) binds 
this roundabout process of industry to a more or less determ inate place and 
routine, such as to make surveillance and control possible. So far as the 
workman under the new phase of technology is dependent for his living on 
the apparatus and the orderly sequence of the “ roundabout process”  his 
work m ay be controlled and the surplus yielded b y  his industry m ay be 
turned to account; it becomes worthwhile to own the m aterial means of in­
dustry, and ownership of the m aterial means in such a situation carries with 
it the usufruct of the com m unity’s immaterial equipment of technological 
proficiency.39
In this way the institution of property and the technological 
scheme come to be the basic elements in the economic arrange­
ment of a community’s life. In a simple technology where habits 
of ownership have not begun to take root there are practically no 
class distinctions, except those which might as a matter of course 
follow differences in workmanship. But as soon as private property 
is firmly implanted rather well-defined class distinctions begin to 
crystallize.40 Veblen does not state that these class distinctions 
originate in private property. The distinctions may have already 
appeared but they do not have an economic basis until private 
property is developed. A t any rate with the growth of property, 
ownership and class differences become inextricably interwoven. 
Thus the early manifestation of ownership serves further to dis­
tinguish the underlying population from the rulers, the war lords, 
the priests, and the magicians. As accumulated wealth increases 
and falls into the hands of the latter they grow into a leisure class 
exempt by virtue of ownership from tangible (industrial) per-
39 The Instinct of Workmanship, pp. 150-51.
4° At least in those cultures genetically related to Western civilization. See ibid., 
pp. 157-60, and p. 202.
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formance, while the underlying population, the keepers of the 
community’s industrial efficiency, perform the necessary produc­
tive labor. This division of classes into the industrially exempt or 
pecuniary, on the one hand, and the industrially employed or 
mechanical on the other, is the source of the conflict in habits 
which Veblen finds running its course from the earliest stages of 
economic evolution on up in to modern times. The modern con­
flict to which attention has already been drawn between the po­
litical state and business enterprise41 on the one side and the 
technicians on the other has been brought on by a cultural bifur­
cation similar to that which occurred in primitive society. The 
tenure of property in the modern community is based, however, 
upon different conditions from those under which the early chief­
tains and priests engrossed wealth, and the modern strategy of 
ownership converges upon a different line of material items. The 
difference in tenure is accounted for by changes in law and custom. 
The difference in the strategy of ownership is held to be the result 
of a technology based upon the application of science to the pro­
duction of wealth.
By classifying Veblen’s theory of evolution as technological, one 
is likely to eliminate, or at all events, minimize the conflict in so­
cial habits just described. Besides, the evidence is abundant that 
Veblen does not understand technology to mean simply the me­
chanical arts. For example, in one place he describes the “ primi­
tive technology” as dominated by the “ non-mechanical arts of 
plant and animal breeding” ;42 and, in another, he contrasts the 
cultural effects of the “primitive technology of tillage and cattle- 
breeding”43 with those of the “ modern technology of the mechanic 
arts.”44 Although he constantly refers to mechanical implements 
he looks upon them as indicative of a high or low degree of indus­
trial efficiency.45 Thus technology, in the sense in which he uses it, 
means the systematic adaptation of ways and means for accom-
41 This relationship Veblen argues at length. See Absentee Ownership, p. 430.
42 The Instinct of Workmanship, p. 90.
« Ibid., p. 100.
44 Ibid., pp. 62-84 and p. 218. Also The Place of Science, pp. 43-55.
« The Instinct of Workmanship, p. 66.
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plishing the economic ends of group life, or, more simply, the 
organization of industrial efficiency. The organization of indus­
trial efficiency may or may not be mechanical in nature but it is 
always material because industrial efficiency always deals with 
the “ brute forces of nature.” It seems clear that Veblen uses 
technology in a sense closely related to that in which Marx uses 
“ modes of production.” As previously noted he maintains that 
the institution of ownership is a “ habit of thought” respecting 
“ the usufruct of the industrial arts.” The objective condition 
which makes the expression of this “ habit of thought” possi­
ble is the increase in technological efficiency. Moreover the par­
ticular “ items of property to which the claims of ownership come 
to attach will . . . .  vary from time to time, according as the 
state of the industrial arts will best afford an effectual exploi­
tation of this usufruct through the tenure of one or another of 
the material items requisite to the pursuit of industry.”46 In other 
words, what is owned depends upon what the technological 
scheme will permit.47 Any given culture is, therefore, a creature of 
its technology.
It  is assumed that in the growth of culture, as in its current maintenance, 
the facts of technological use and wont are fundam ental and definitive, in 
the sense that they underlie and condition the scope and method of civilisa­
tion in other than the technological respect, but not in such a sense as to pre­
clude or overlook the degree in which these other conventions of any given 
civilisation in their turn react on the state of the industrial arts.48
While the technological scheme creates the economic possibili­
ties of ownership, the discipline which it exerts upon the industrial 
classes who are habitually employed in it conflicts with that ex­
erted by the institution of private property. This conflict in occu­
pational habituation is just as essential to VeblenJs theory of evo­
lution as class struggle is to Marx’s. The role which it plays in 
Veblen’s theory of economic evolution is analogous to that which 
class struggle plays in the Marxian interpretation. The two types 
of conflict constitute the mechanism through which material or 
economic circumstances transmit their influence. Because of its
46 Ibid., p. 151.
48 The Instinct of Workmanship, p. vii.
47 The Place of Science, p. 333.
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dividuals who own the means of production. Since, however, 
those who supply labor no more than those who own the means of 
production have any exclusive claim to the “ engrossed” surplus, 
the institution of property, instead of being the basis of a theory 
of labor exploitation, leads to the idea of the misdirection of the 
community’s industrial efficiency.54 Under these conditions it is 
impossible to develop class struggle as a method by which labor, 
conscious of its productive function, seeks to establish its corre­
sponding distributive rights. Although in Veblen’s analysis the in­
stitution of ownership places the pecuniary and technical classes 
in distinctive consumption and production categories, the distri­
bution of income comes in as a highly adventitious rather than as a 
determining factor in shaping class antagonisms.
In spite of the great dissimilarity in the mechanism through 
which economic factors exert themselves in the Marxian and 
Veblenian explanations, there is one important but general respect 
in which the two are identical. Whether the broad sweep of his­
tory is viewed in the perspective of class struggle or in that of con­
flicting occupational disciplines the character of any particular 
epoch will be seen as the expression of the prevailing behavior pat­
tern in which the men of that time move, think, and have their so­
cial being. This behavior pattern, which includes law, politics, 
civil relations, knowledge, and belief, is in turn the product more 
or less directly of the existing form of economic organization. 
Consequently, any change in the economic or materialistic basis of 
society will enforce a corresponding change in the behavior pat­
tern, and will thereby bring about a social transformation. But it 
is right at this point that an extreme divergence again crops out 
between the two theories.
54 Yet “engrossing” the surplus does serve as the basis of economic class differenti­
ation. “ The three conventionally recognised classes, upper, middle, and lower, are 
all and several pecuniary categories; the upper being typically that (aristocratic) 
class which is possessed of wealth without having worked or bargained for it; while 
the middle class have come by their holdings through some form of commercial 
(business) traffic; and the lower class gets what it has by workmanship. It is a 
gradation of (a) predation, (b) business, (c) industry; the former being disserviceable 
and gainful, the second gainful, and the third serviceable.” The Instinct of Workman­
ship, p. 184.
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II
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL MUTATIONISM
The manner in which the individual is assumed to respond to 
economic stimuli and the way in which the environment, from 
which the stimuli arise, itself changes, are different in the two 
theories. Because of this the interaction between the behavior 
pattern and the material conditions varies according to whether 
reasoning proceeds in the dialectics of class struggle or in the logic 
of conflicting occupational habituations. When class struggle is 
the basis of reasoning, institutional change is deterministic and 
teleological. When occupational habituation is the basis of reason­
ing, change, although inevitable, is uncertain in character and 
proceeds as chance variations. In the former case the theory of 
movement is historical materialism, and in the latter, institutional 
mutationism.
To bring out the dissimilarity in the assumptions of Marx and 
Veblen concerning the interaction between man and material con­
ditions and, thereby, the contrasts in their respective theories, we 
will begin by noting the relationship between the behavior pattern 
and the economic structure as posited by Marx and how changes 
in the latter induce changes in the former. According to Marx the 
behavior pattern is determined by the social relations that arise 
from the conditions of production, distribution, and exchange. 
Hence changes in these conditions will produce changes in the so­
cial relations and in that way provoke a change in the behavior 
pattern.55 Marx asks:
Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that m an’s ideas, views, 
and conceptions, in one word, m an’s consciousness, changes with every 
change in the conditions of his m aterial existence, in his social relations, and in 
his social life? W hat else does the history of ideas prove than that intellectual 
production changes in character in proportion as m aterial production is 
changed?56
Inasmuch as Marx makes material changes (changes in the mode 
of production, distribution, and exchange) proceed in conformity
ss Critique of Political Economy (Kerr edition, Chicago, 1904), p. n .
56 The Communist Manifesto, p. 51.
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with the dialectics of class struggle, the corresponding changes in 
social relations and in the behavior pattern proceed in like fashion. 
When, for example, the means of production are the property of a 
given class, as in a capitalistic economy, the social relations reflect 
the subordination of the non-propertied class by the propertied. 
The prevailing behavior pattern is thus the ideological reflection 
of the economic prerogatives and political power of the owners of 
property.
Upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of exist­
ence, as foundation, there is built a superstructure of diversified and char­
acteristic sentiments, illusions, habits of thought, and outlooks on life in 
general. T h e class as a whole creates and shapes them out of its material 
foundation, and out of the corresponding social relationships.57
Since according to Marx the prevailing behavior pattern is noth­
ing more than the manifestation in the ideal world of the subor­
dination of one class by another, it is through the revolutionary 
displacement of the existing ruling class by the subordinated that 
a transformation is brought about in the behavior pattern. But 
before such a transformation is possible it is necessary, (i) that 
the material (productive) forces will have reached their full de­
velopment in the old society; and (2) that the subordinated class, 
conscious of this development, will recognize itself to be the in­
strument of economic necessity and will act accordingly:
A n oppressed class is the vita l condition of every society based upon the 
antagonism of classes. T h e emancipation of the oppressed class therefore 
necessarily implies the creation of a new society. In order for the oppressed 
class to be emancipated it is necessary that the productive powers already 
acquired and the existing social relations should no longer be able to exist 
side by  side. Of all the instruments of production the greatest productive 
power is the revolutionary class itself. T he organisation of the revolutionary 
elements as a class supposes the existence of all the productive forces which 
can be engendered in the bosom of the old society.58
How do these changes in productive forces create in the subor­
dinated class this awareness of economic necessity and the willing­
ness to act in accordance with it? It has been noted that in the 
Marxian interpretation changes in the modes of production (the
57 The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, pp. 7-8.
s8 The Poverty of Philosophy (Kerr edition, Chicago, n.d.), pp. 189-90.
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material basis of society) exert themselves upon human behavior, 
and consequently upon history, through the differential effect of 
economic conditions upon social classes. These conditions, im­
posed by changes in the productive forces, take their effect in the 
form of income. And it is the exigencies of income which create in 
the different classes a consciousness of the difference in their mate­
rial circumstances. As a result of the differential hardship experi­
enced by the less fortunate class it becomes conscious of the dis- 
serviceability of the old economic arrangements. It is likewise 
these same conditions that cause the less fortunate class to recog­
nize the untenability of the ideological forms of the old society. 
Thus the less fortunate class sets out to refashion the economic 
structure along lines conformable with its economic interest. In 
doing so, it brings about a new set of values, new standards of 
judgments, in brief, creates a new behavior pattern.
In the conditions of the proletariat, those of old society at large are al­
ready virtually swamped. T h e proletarian is without property; his relation 
to his wife and children has no longer anything in common with the bourgeois 
fam ily relations; modern industrial labor, modern subjection to capital, the 
same in England as in France, in Am erica as in Germany, has stripped him 
of every trace of national character. Law , m orality, religion, are to him so 
m any bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many
bourgeois interests...........T h e proletarians cannot become masters of the
productive forces of society except by  abolishing their own previous mode 
of appropriation, and thereby also every other previous mode of appropria­
tion. T h ey  have nothing of their own to secure and to fortify; their mission 
is to destroy all previous securities for and insurances of individual property.59
The foregoing analysis leads to the following conclusions. One 
of the underlying assumptions in the Marxian theory of change is 
that individuals in the final analysis will always choose that line of 
action which is in keeping with their material class interests. This 
assumption is based upon a tacit belief in the reasoned response of 
human beings to economic stimulation. Another assumption is 
that changes in the economic environment take place dialectically. 
Marx states, for example, in his analysis of capitalism, that “ the 
modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course of de­
velopment, of a series of revolutions in the modes of production
59 The Communist Manifesto, p. 42.
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and of exchange,” 60 and he adds that “ the bourgeoisie cannot exist 
without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, 
and with them the whole relations of society.”61 It is only with 
these assumptions guided by a purposive logic that Marx was able 
to predict invariant changes in production which would for cer­
tainty give rise to differential class hardship, and that the human 
beings affected by these conditions would respond to them in a 
manner requisite to the teleological demands of his scheme of 
evolution.
Marxian materialism, proclaimed Engels, “ is destined to do for 
history what Darwin’s theory has done for biology.” 62 And Marx 
himself “ greeted Darwin’s theory of evolution as a ‘support from 
natural science.’ ”63 It is not strange that Marx and Engels, pre­
occupied with the arduous labors of propagating heterodox ideas 
in a hostile intellectual environment, overlooked the stark differ­
ences between their own preconceptions and those of Darwin. Ex­
cept for superficial resemblances in terminology, there is hardly 
any connection between class conflict and Darwin’s principles of 
“ struggle for existence” and “ natural selection.” For when the 
dialectics of historical movement is made to proceed in terms of 
Darwin’s biological principles it is impossible to predict the char­
acter and form of social change. On the basis of Darwinism change 
would occur as chance variations, unpredictable phenomena, 
highly uncertain in outcome, and tending to no predetermined 
goal. Moreover, the effect of Darwin’s theory upon psychology 
we now know invalidates Marx’s assumption respecting the re­
sponse of the individual to the material or economic environment. 
Thus Veblen, who developed his theory of economic evolution 
from Darwinian principles, makes the following criticism of the 
theory of human behavior on which class struggle is based. He 
states:
Under the Darwinian norm it must be held that men’s reasoning is largely 
controlled by other than logical, intellectual forces; that the conclusion
60 Ibid., p. 32. 61 Ibid., p. 34.
62 See Engels’ introduction to the Communist Manifesto.
63 Max Eastman, “ Marx and Lenin,” The Science of Revolution (New York, 1927), 
p. 67.
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reached by public or class opinion is as much, or more, a matter of sentiment 
than of logical inference; and that the sentiment which animates men, singly 
or collectively, is as much, or more, an outcome of habit and native pro­
pensity as of calculated material interest. There is, for instance, no warrant 
in the Darwinian scheme of things for asserting a priori that the class interest 
of the working class will bring them to take a stand against the propertied 
class. It may as well be that their training in subservience to their employers 
will bring them again to realise the equity and excellence of the established
system of subjection and unequal distribution of wealth..........It is quite
impossible on Darwinian ground to foretell whether the “ proletariat” will 
go on to establish the socialistic revolution or turn aside again, and sink their 
force in the broad sands of patriotism .64
It is evident that Veblen’s assumptions concerning the psychol­
ogy of human nature are different from Marx’s.65 There is, how­
ever, some agreement between them respecting the weight of ma­
terial or economic conditions as factors of change. According to 
Veblen:
The material conditions of industry, trade and daily life during the period 
of transition and approach to this modern ground created that frame of 
mind which we call the modern point of view and dictated that reconstruc­
tion of institutional arrangements which has been worked out under its 
guidance. Therefore the economic situation which so underlay and con­
ditioned this modern point of view at the period when it was given its stable 
form becomes the necessary point of departure for any argument bearing on 
the changes that have been going forward since then, or on any prospective 
reconstruction that may be due to follow from these changed conditions in 
the calculable future.66
Like Marx he would also argue that changes in the economic con­
ditions carry with them changes in the behavior pattern.
Any large and persistent change in the material conditions— such, e.g., as 
has been taking effect in the scale and methods of industry during the past 
one hundred years— will necessarily be followed in due course by more or 
less pronounced changes in the established order of human relations and
64 The Place of Science, pp. 441-42.
65 The class struggle is worked out by Marx with the aid of implicit rational psy­
chological assumptions. Yet his criticism of Bentham’s principle of utility and like­
wise of the materialism of Feuerbach are very suggestive of the much later objec­
tive types of psychology. See “ Marx on Feuerbach” in Frederick Engels, Feuerbach, 
The Roots of Socialist Philosophy (Kerr edition, Chicago, 1903), p. 129. Also Marx, 
Capital, I, 668, n. 2; and Eastman, op. cit., pp. 220-22.
66 The Vested Interests, p. 26.
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principles of conduct; but it need not follow that the resulting changes in 
law and morals will be of such a nature as to enhance the facility of life under 
the new order of material conditions which has induced these changes.6?
But while Veblen accepts material conditions as the driving force 
in his scheme of evolution he makes these conditions and likewise 
human nature follow Darwinian principles rather than Hegelian 
logic. In addition to Darwin’s principles of “ struggle for exist­
ence” and “ natural selection,” he also makes use of the Mendelian 
law of inheritance, and the mutation theory of deVries. By con­
structing his theory of economic evolution in the framework of 
Darwinism, or neo-Darwinism when the theories of deVries and 
Mendel are included, Veblen makes institutional change a process 
of discontinuous variations in habituation and in material condi­
tions.
T he growth of culture is a cum ulative sequence of habituation, and the 
ways and means of it are habitual response of human nature to exigencies 
that vary  incontinently, cum ulatively, but with something of a consistent 
sequence in the cum ulative variations that so go forward,— incontinently, be­
cause each new move creates a new situation which induces a further new 
variation in the habitual manner of response; cum ulatively, because each 
new situation is a variation of what has gone before it and embodies as causal 
factors all that has been effected by what went before; consistently, because 
the underlying traits of human nature (propensities, aptitudes, and what 
not) by force of which the response takes place, and on the ground of which 
the habituation takes effect, remain substantially unchanged.68
Even though he accepts material factors as driving forces, he 
can make no prediction that they will necessarily bring about a 
better scheme of social relations.69 Nor can he predict the form 
these changes are destined to take or their effect upon human na­
ture. He could not do so and remain consistent with his Dar­
winian premises. On the basis of these premises he maintains that 
changes in economic conditions come in as innovations, or as the
67 Absentee Ownership, p. 18. 68 The Place of Science, pp. 241-42.
69 This aloof objectivity is not maintained with any great degree of consistency. 
For example, in his criticism of the inefficiency of business enterprise, he implies 
that capitalism is to be supplanted by a more serviceable and more efficient, there­
fore more desirable(?) type of economic organization. See The Theory of Business 
Enterprise, especially chaps, viii and ix; and The Engineers and the Price System, 
chaps, i, ii, and vi.
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results of borrowings and the diffusion of culture. Maintaining 
that economic changes are chance phenomena, that is, that they 
proceed mutationally70 rather than dialectically, and that human 
nature responds to them in terms of native propensity and habit, 
Veblen denies that a revision of the code of conduct follows imme­
diately or soon after the impact of economic changes. “ Institu­
tions,” he says, “ by no means change with the alacrity which the 
sole efficiency of a reasoned class interest would require.” 71 Ac­
cordingly, in an advanced culture there is always going on a pro­
gressive displacement of old institutions, their corresponding hab­
its, and systems of knowledge and beliefs by new ones. But new 
institutions do not immediately displace old ones. The old institu­
tions tend to lag in a more or less decadent state. Consequently 
change is the resultant of a drawn-out contest between old and 
new institutions, or social habits, as the prevailing way of life in 
the community.
T he situation of today shapes institutions of tomorrow through a selec­
tive, coercive process, by  acting upon men’s habitual view of things, and so 
altering or fortifying a point of view or a mental attitude handed down from 
the past. T he institutions— that is to say the habits of thought—  under the 
guidance of which men live are in this w ay received from an earlier time; 
more or less remotely earlier, but in any event they have been elaborated in 
and received from the past. Institutions are products of the past process, are 
adapted to past circumstances, and are therefore never in full accord with 
the requirements of the present. In  the nature of the case, this process of 
selective adaptation can never catch up with the progressively changing 
situation in which the community finds itself at any given time; for the en­
vironment, the situation, the exigencies of life which enforce the adaptation 
and exercise the selection, change from day to day; and each successive situa­
tion of the community in its turn tends to obsolescence as soon as it has been 
established.?2
7° “ The mutation theories,”  he stated, “ of course, have immediately to do with 
the facts of biological derivation alone, but when the facts are reviewed in the light 
of these theories it will be found that questions of cultural origins and relationship 
are necessarily drawn into the inquiry.”  The Place of Science, p. 458. Accordingly 
the appearance of private property making for the “ supercession of free work­
manship by a pecuniary control of industry” was the “ most universal and most 
radical mutation which human culture has undergone in its advance from savagery 
to civilisation.” The Instinct of Workmanship, p. 147.
71 The Place of Science, p. 314.
72 The Theory of the Leisure Class1 pp. 190-91.
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Before inquiring into the interaction between variations in hu­
man nature and in material conditions as viewed by Veblen, an 
examination should be made of his conception of human nature. 
In a previous quotation he stated that human nature “ remains 
substantially unchanged.” This seems to conflict with another 
statement of his that “ the human material of society itself varies 
with changing conditions of life.” 73 The contradiction arises from 
the fact that at one time he views human nature as a chang­
ing phenomenon, and at another, as a stable one. It is reconciled, 
however, in his explanation of the composition of human nature. 
Human nature or the “ spiritual nature of man” is made up of a 
“ complement of instinctive dispositions” which include “ native 
propensity and its appropriate sentiment.”74 These instinctive 
dispositions Veblen enumerates as follows: the sense of workman­
ship (instinct of workmanship), the parental bent, the self-regard- 
ing feeling, the pugnacious disposition, and instinctive or idle 
curiosity.75 Since these native propensities are the “ irreducible 
elements of human nature” arising from “ quasi-tropismatic or 
physiological nature”76 they as well as the physiological traits are 
inherited.77 But the co-ordination of these inherited traits is dif­
ferent as between racial stocks; and the permutation and com­
bination of them vary as between individuals of the same racial 
stock. We can therefore say that Veblen conceives human nature 
to be stable or unchanging because, (i) the nature or purposive 
ends of native proclivities do not change; (2) the native traits are 
transmitted according to Mendelian inheritance; and, (3) because 
each racial type has its own relatively fixed endowment of in­
stincts.78 On the other hand, human nature becomes a mutating
73 Ibid., p. 213.
74 The Instinct of Workmanship, p. 14.
7s Ibid., pp. 24, 25, 26, 27, 33, 34, 35, 86, 89, and 90. Veblen’s criticism of the in­
stinct concept should be noted. He says that although instinct is shifty and lacks 
precision for exhaustive psychological analysis, it can be used in the analysis of insti­
tutions. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
76 Ibid., p. 3. 77 Ibid., p. 13.
78 “It is perhaps as needless to insist on this spiritual difference between the various 
racial stocks as it would be difficult to determine the specific differences that are 
known to exist, or to exhibit them convincingly in detail. To some such ground 
much of the distinctive character of different peoples is no doubt to be assigned,
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or provisionally unstable phenomenon whenever pure racial types 
are crossed. A pure racial stock approaches uniformity in both its 
physical and its spiritual or instinctive characteristics,79 whereas a 
hybrid stock shows extreme diversity in these respects.
The countries which best typify hybridization and which, at the 
same time, have carried materia] development and individual suc­
cess based upon it to their highest pitch are England, United 
States, France, Germany, Denmark, and Holland.80 The hybrid 
populations of these countries are composed of three ethnic types, 
the dolichocephalic-blond, the brachycephalic-brunette, and the 
Mediterranean. These three racial types are placed by Veblen 
into two categories, the predatory and the ante-predatory, “ the 
dolicho-blond type showing more of the characteristics of the 
predatory temperament— or at least more of the violent disposi­
tion— than the brachycephalic-brunette type, and especially more 
than the Mediterranean/’81 Since within each ethnic type there is 
a predatory and an ante-predatory variant, it is probable, says 
Veblen that “ the effective temperament of modern communities is 
not altogether due to a selection between stable ethnic types. It 
seems to be to some appreciable extent a selection between the 
predatory and the peaceable (ante-predatory) variants of the sev­
eral types.”82 This difference in the character of the two variants 
is traceable to a difference in range of instincts and their co-ordi­
nation. In the ante-predatory variant, the self-regarding and pug­
nacious instincts are weak in comparison with the parental bent. 
To the parental bent is traceable the “ bias for serviceability and 
against waste.” This bias “ falls in directly with the promptings of 
the instinct of workmanship, so that these two instinctive predis­
positions will re-enforce one another in conducing to an imperson­
ally economical use of materials and resources as well as to the
though much also may as well be traceable to local peculiarities of environment and 
of institutional circumstances. Something of the kind, a specific difference in the 
genius of the people, is by common consent assigned, for instance, in explanation of 
the pervasive difference in technology and workmanship between the Western cul­
ture and the Far East.” Ibid., p. i n .  Also Imperial Germany, p. 2.
79 The Instinct of Workmanship, pp. 14-15.
80 Imperial Germany, p. 6. Also Instinct of Workmanship, pp. 15-16.
81 The Theory of the Leisure Class, p. 217. 82 Ibid.
62 ABRAM L. HARRIS
full use of workmanlike capacities, and to an endless taking of 
pains.”83 The motives of this type being non-emulative and non- 
invidious will under the stress of the “ struggle for existence” be­
come crystallized into habits connected with the non-competitive 
productive (industrial) side of economic activity. On the other 
hand, the predatory type is pugnacious and self-regarding. Al­
though the sense of workmanship and the parental instinct are 
also present in this type they are overridden by the other two. 
The habits to whose formation this type of native endowment 
conduces are individual thrift, acquisitiveness, and competitive 
emulation. In brief, the predatory variant of human nature is 
the basis of invidious or self-regarding and pecuniary habits. 
These two types of aptitudes or propensities and their correspond­
ing sentiments and habits are the spiritual inheritance of the hy­
brid peoples of the Western world. Because they are hybrids, 
these peoples possess an extreme diversity of temperament and 
tend in their breeding to revert to one of the two variants of hu­
man nature. This variability has important institutional bear­
ings. On the one hand,
. . . .  a larger, fuller, more varied and more broadly balanced scheme of 
culture will, under tolerable circumstances, be found among such a people 
than in a community made up of individuals that breed true with a close 
approximation to a single specific type.84
but on the other,
. . . .  a hybrid population will, of course, also have the faults of its quali­
ties. T he divergence of temperament and proclivities will be as wide as that 
of its capacities and aptitudes; and the unrest that works out in a multiform 
ramification of achievements on the one side is likely to work out also in a 
profuse output of irritation and dissentient opinions, ideals and aspirations 
on the other side. For good or ill, such has been the congenital make-up of 
the W estern peoples, and such, it m ay be called to mind, has also been the 
history of W estern civilisation.8*
Veblen’s conception of human nature as set forth in the preced­
ing paragraphs leads him to different conclusions from those of 
Marx respecting the interaction of human nature and material 
conditions. The conclusions may be summarized in the following
8* The Instinct of Workmanship, p. 60.
84 Imperial Germany, p. 9. 85 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
manner in order to show the contrast they make between his in­
stitutional mutationism and Marx’s historical materialism:
Conclusion (1): T he native endowment or peculiar nature of a given 
people determines the range and character of their habits thereby constitut­
ing the spiritual complex out of which their institutions are developed. B ut 
this native genius will thus express itself only under appropriate material 
and economic conditions; and
Conclusion (2): W here human nature possesses a high degree of variabil­
ity  resulting from crossing, the institutional scheme is apt to be more varied 
and complex because the response to changing economic circumstance is 
more ready than where the racial stock breeds true to a given type. There­
fore under the pressure of economic vicissitudes, a population that is rela­
tively  unstable m ay give rise to one or several divergent institutional 
growths. These divergent institutional growths m ay in time become ac­
commodated to each other or one of them m ay succeed in displacing or sub­
ordinating the others.
From the first conclusion it follows that the development of 
such habits, and therefore institutions, as a given native psycho­
logical equipment will afford, will appear only under the stress of 
economic or material circumstances. The process whereby these 
traits are crystallized into habits is one of Darwinian selection. In 
the “ struggle for existence” the individuals possessing the neces­
sary traits for survival in the given physical and economic en­
vironment will survive but those devoid of these traits will be 
weeded out. Thus the ethnic types out of which the hybrid peo­
ples of Western civilization arose survived because they were 
adaptable to the physical and economic environment in which 
they found themselves. The emergence of these mutant types 
Veblen attributes to some physiological strain induced in the 
parent stock by changes in its physical environment and indus­
trial organization.86 These two sets of material conditions, espe­
cially those in the industrial arts, exercised both a selective and dis­
ciplinary influence upon the types falling within their scope. How 
the industrial changes came to exercise this influence Veblen dem­
onstrates in his account of the emergence of the blond mutant.
The economic organisation which existed about the time the 
blond type emerged is described by him as the “ savage state of the
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industrial arts,” a technology of primitive husbandry of domesti­
cated animals and crop plants but one in which the mechanic arts 
were only moderately advanced. It was a peaceful (ante-preda­
tory) culture dominated by considerations of collective welfare. 
As the blond was essentially more ferocious than either of the two 
other types that had become adapted to the primitive technology 
it would be expected that he would be something of a “ disturber 
of the peace.” Something of the kind did occur as is revealed in 
the sagas of the North Sea peoples.87 Although prone to piracy 
and marauding88 the blond stock never established a full blown 
“ predatory” culture such as was developed by the “ Semitic in­
vaders in the East” ;89 first, because it was a more or less peaceable 
variant of the predatory type of human nature; and, second, be­
cause predaceous propensities are best crystallized into habits 
under a pastoral (patriarchal) technology. The peculiar topogra­
phy of Europe, “ small-scale and broken” would not admit of this 
type of economic organization.90 Consequently the predatory dis­
positions of the blond took the form of “ fraud” and “ emulous rival­
ry.” These traits found their natural expression in habits of acqui­
sition and ownership, the psychological basis of the pecuniary cul­
ture. With the appearance therefore of the dolicho-blond the “ sav­
age state of industrial arts” was subjected to a pecuniary control 
the social implications of which were outlined in an earlier part of 
this essay. But the blond, being of a mechanical turn of mind, 
would find the mechanic arts as much of an outlet for his instinctive 
endowment as the institution of ownership. As a result, not only 
was the primitive technology subordinated to a pecuniary control 
with the appearance of the blond, but its mechanical character was 
elaborated and extended. But once the institution of ownership 
was established, causing industry to undergo pecuniary control and 
guidance, the economic basis was laid for a whole series of non­
industrial or leisure-class occupations. These occupations tended 
to perpetuate predatory habits, the individuals highly endowed 
with the corresponding invidious or self-regarding traits being se-
87 See Veblen, Laxdoela Saga (New York, 1925).
88 The Place of Science, pp. 498-99.
89 The Instinct of Workmanship, p. 202. 90 Ibid., p. 213.
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lected for employment in them. On the contrary, the industrial 
occupations furthered ante-predatory habits tending therefore to 
attract those individuals characterized by the corresponding in­
stinctive endowment. In this way these two strains of human na­
ture, the ante-predatory and the quasi-predatory, were selected 
and perpetuated in the biological and psychological inheritance of 
the hybrid peoples of Western civilization. Since the two modes of 
economic activity, the pecuniary and the industrial, whereby 
these racial stocks and their natural endowment were perpetu­
ated, still exist in the economic life of these modern peoples, Veb- 
len would argue that their ancient selective and disciplinary effect 
is the same as it was in the distant past. The result of this is that 
in the modern community human nature has been preserved along 
one of the two lines of racial inheritance.91
From our second conclusion summarized above it appears that 
the variability of human nature gives rise to a complex institu­
tional structure in which mutations may at any time be large and 
ultimately disruptive of the established order. The institutional 
implications of variability are best shown in the response of Veb- 
len’s two variants of human nature to modern economic circum­
stances. We have observed that the crossing of the dolicho-blond 
stock with the Mediterranean and the brachycephalic-brunette re­
sulted in toning down an otherwise ruthless predaceousness. This 
cross-breeding gave rise to the two variants of human nature, the 
ante-predatory or non-invidious, and the quasi-predatory or in­
vidious, to either of which the Western peoples may revert in their 
breeding. Under modern economic arrangements class distinc­
tions are fashioned in terms of the spiritual make-up of the two 
variants. This comes about through the selective discipline of the 
pecuniary and the industrial occupations. Those individuals who 
are drawn into the pecuniary or non-industrial employments, usu­
ally of a predatory temperament, constitute a leisure “ non-pro­
ductive” class. Those who are attracted to the industrial or me­
chanical occupations, mainly of non-invidious predilections, are 
the “ productive” working class. In keeping with this division of 
classes Veblen would attribute the radicalism of the industrial
91 The Theory of the Leisure Class, p. 240.
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classes and the conservatism of the leisure class to the discipline 
exercised by his two modes of vocational activity upon the two 
different categories of racial endowment.92
This differentiation of classes in terms of native endowment is 
not as definitive as it first appears in the perspective of occupa­
tional discipline. In the first place, the “ selective elimination of 
pecuniary traits is an uncertain process.” Thus the predatory 
animus may crop out even among the industrial classes.93 In the 
second place, there is to be found among the industrial classes 
acquired habits that are decidedly invidious or self-regarding.94 
The outcropping of inherited invidious traits among the industrial 
or working classes Veblen accounts for by the high degree of vari­
ability in the racial stock. But the persistence of acquired invidi­
ous traits in the lower social stratum he attributes to the impor­
tant fact that the social ethic is so dominated by the moral code of 
the pecuniary classes that few individuals whatever their voca­
tional activity escape its influence.95 Finally, another reason why 
the differentiation of social classes according to native endowment 
is not definitive is the possibility of reversions to the ante-preda­
tory type of human nature among the pecuniary or leisure class.
The employments of the leisure classes in modern industry are such as to
keep alive certain of the predatory habits and aptitudes..........But there is
something to be said on the other side. Individuals so placed as to be exempt 
from strain may survive and transmit their characteristics even if they differ 
widely from the average of the species both in physique and in spiritual 
make-up. The chances for a survival and transmission of atavistic traits are 
greatest in those classes that are most sheltered from the stress of circum­
stances. The leisure class is in some degree sheltered from the stress of the 
industrial situation, and should, therefore, afford an exceptionally great 
proportion of reversions to the peaceable or savage temperament. It should 
be possible for such aberrant or atavistic individuals to unfold their life 
activity on ante-predatory lines without suffering as prompt a repression or 
elimination as in the lower walks of life.96
Although leisure-class and industrial traits overlap in their insti­
tutional manifestations, Veblen insists that there is on the average
92 The Theory of Business Enterprise, p. 354, n. 1.
93 The Theory of the Leisure Class, p. 242.
94 Ibid.} p. 242. 95 Ibid., p. 242. 96 Ibid., pp. 233-34.
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a generic difference between the two underlying types of human 
nature and, therefore, a corresponding difference in the reaction of 
his two occupational classes to industrial conditions. According to 
him the aforementioned reversions that take place among the 
leisure class never attain the magnitude and violent intensity such 
as would bring on the destruction of the pecuniary scheme and the 
code of values based upon it. The atavistic leisure-class variant is 
satisfied with the outlet afforded him in those non-invidious pur­
suits which are ameliorative rather than revolutionary. On the 
other hand, barring chance variations of a predatory nature, the 
invidious habits copied from the leisure class by the industrial are 
hardly strong enough to stifle the revolutionary frame of mind 
which naturally crops out among the latter under sufficiently 
provocative economic circumstances.
Now if there is always a possibility of human nature reverting 
to one of two types of psychological endowment, as Veblen main­
tains, it is impossible to know as Marx did that human nature will 
always respond to given economic changes in a predetermined 
way. In view of this it is impossible to know the goal of economic 
evolution. Such foreknowledge is all the more precarious if there 
is, as Veblen maintains, an interplay of different traits of endow­
ment within the industrial and leisure classes; for one cannot be 
certain as Marx was that the former class will everywhere come to 
take a stand of revolutionary solidarity against the latter and its 
social prerogatives. Moreover, if, as Veblen contends, habituation 
takes effect only in terms of native endowment, the latter sets the 
limits of tolerance within which any given range of economic or 
material changes can be effective; therefore, the success of a revo­
lutionary reorganization of society depends to a large degree upon 
the racial endowment of the social group undertaking it. To use 
his words:
. . . .  all the while the changeless native proclivities of the race will assert 
themselves in some measure in any eventual revision of the received institu­
tional system; and always they will stand ready eventually to break the 
ordered scheme of things into a paralytic mass of confusion if it can not be 
bent into some possible degree of congruity with the paramount native needs 
of life.97
97 The Vested Interest, p. n .
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The differences which we have sought to establish between Veb- 
len’s institutional mutationism and Marx’s historical materialism 
— differences in the inner mechanism of the two theories growing 
out of opposite assumptions concerning human nature and its 
interaction with material conditions— all grow out of one impor­
tant fundamental. This is that the two explanations of economic 
evolution are constructed on the basis of different postulates, a 
consideration of which will conclude our analysis.
I l l
THE DARWINIAN AND HEGELIAN POSTULATES 
By reasoning from Darwinian postulates Veblen sees economic 
evolution as a “ non-teleological” process in which the “ fittest” in­
stitutions or “ habits of thought” survive through “natural selec­
tion.” It is a matter of variation in which the selective power of 
any institution or set of institutions derives from the successive 
elimination of those variations (institutional growths) that are 
harmful in the “ struggle for existence.” 98
“ Struggle for existence” is used by Veblen in a cultural or moral 
sense, not in a biological one.99 Had he used it in the latter sense? 
to be consistent, he would have had to view economic evolution as 
the result of competition for subsistence in the perpetuation of 
life as a physiological process. This would have led him to base 
the “ survival” value of institutions upon their efficiency in ful­
filling physical or natural needs. Such an explanation is admittedly 
crude and naive. For life as we know it is a “ struggle for exist­
ence” only in a highly artificial sense. The strivings which make 
up by far the larger part of life are not biological or physiological 
but cultural and aesthetic. This Veblen recognized and, there­
fore, limited the application of “ struggle for existence” in the bio­
logical sense to the lower forms of culture, and even there with 
considerable modification.100 When he comes to a consideration of 
institutional change and growth on the higher cultural levels? 
where advanced technology and accumulated wealth have de­
veloped, his Darwinian postulates serve him merely for the pur-
98 The Theory of the Leisure Class, p. 188.
99 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 100 Ibid., p. 26. Also pp. 28-29.
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pose of analogous reasoning. Thus in modern industrial society 
“ struggle for existence” is mainly a struggle for “ economic re­
spectability.”
If, as is sometimes assumed, the incentive to accumulation were the want 
of subsistence or of physical comfort, then the aggregate economic wants of 
a community might conceivably be satisfied at some point in the advance of 
industrial efficiency; but since the struggle is substantially a race for rep­
utability on the basis of an invidious comparison, no approach to a defini­
tive attainm ent is possible.101 . . . .  Under modern conditions the struggle for 
existence has, in a very  appreciable degree, been transformed into a struggle 
to keep up appearances.102
And as a struggle for “ economic respectability” the modern 
“ struggle for existence” is only remotely related to material or 
physical well-being. It revolves about certain intangible values to 
which individuals become accustomed as their “ standard of liv­
ing.”
A fter making proper allowance for individual exceptions and for the ac­
tion of prudential restraints, it m ay be said, in a general w ay, that this 
emulation in expenditure stands ever ready to absorb any margin of income 
that remains after the ordinary physical wants and comforts have been pro­
vided for, and, further, that it presently becomes as hard to give up that 
part of one’s habitual “ standard of living”  which is due to the struggle for
respectability, as it is to give up m any physical com forts...........I t  comes
about through the working of this principle [emulation] that even the crea­
ture comforts, which are in themselves desirable, and it m ay even be, requi­
site to life on a passably satisfactory plane, acquire a value as a means of 
respectability quite independent of, and out of proportion to, their simple 
utility  as a means of livelihood.103
Under Veblen’s Darwinian postulates, then, the “ survival” 
value of given economic arrangements depends upon their effi­
ciency in enabling various members of the group to maintain or to 
expand their standard of living.104 The concrete measure of this 
efficiency is found in the relation of cost to serviceability.
In any evolutionary system  of economics the central question touching 
the efficiency and fitness of any given system of production is necessarily 
the question as to the excess of serviceability in the product over cost of pro-
101 Ibid., p. 32. 102 The Place of Science, p. 399.
103 Ibid., pp. 394-95. (Italics mine.) Also The Theory of the Leisure Class, p. 195.
104 The Theory of the Leisure Class, p. 194.
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duction. I t  is in such an excess of serviceability over cost that the chance of 
survival lies for any system of production, in so far as the question of sur­
vival is a question of production, and this m atter comes into the speculation 
of M arx only indirectly or incidentally, and leads to nothing in his argu­
m ent.105
Since, however, the consumptive habits to which individuals have 
become habituated are the standard by which they measure their 
“ fulness of life,” institutional change, as a conscious process, is 
brought about by those individuals whose “ fulness of life” is 
jeopardized by changing economic conditions.
A n y one who is required to change his habits of life and his habitual rela­
tions to his fellow-men will feel the discrepancy between the method of life 
required of him by the newly arisen exigencies, and the traditional scheme of 
life to which he is accustomed. It  is the individuals placed in this position 
who have the liveliest incentive to reconstruct the received scheme of life 
and are most readily persuaded to accept new standards; and it is through 
the need of the means of livelihood that men are placed in such a position.106
Although “ fulness of life,” which Veblen thus makes the con­
scious end of human beings in the “ struggle for existence,” never 
appears as an explicit feature of Marx’s class struggle, it does 
seem to underlie the class struggle, implicitly.107 But since, as 
we shall show, the class struggle is patterned after the dialectics 
of Hegel and accordingly possesses Hegelian characteristics, “ ful­
ness of life” so far as it comes into the Marxian theory of evolu­
tion is a highly metaphysical conception.
In the Hegelian system proper “ the struggle which constitutes 
the method of movement or evolution is . . .  . the struggle of 
the spirit for self-realisation by the process of the well-known 
three-phase dialectic.” 108 The Marxian movement like the Hege­
lian is the unfolding of an inner necessity. Whereas Reality in the 
Hegelian scheme is Spirit (Idea), in the Marxian it is the sub­
limated material life of man, or labor in the abstract. Labor as 
metaphysical substance is the Marxian absolute in terms of which 
meaning or value is ascribed to economic arrangements. It is im-
105 The Place of Science, p. 444. 106 The Theory of the Leisure Class, p. 195*
107 See, for example, Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels (edited by Franz Mehring, Berlin, 1923), II, 132.
108 The Place of Science, pp. 414-15.
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measurable and without value, since “ there exists no such thing 
as the value of labor in the common acceptance of the word.”
Labour is the substance, and the immanent measure of value, but has
itself no value...........In the expression “ value of labour,”  the idea of value
is not only com pletely obliterated, but actually reversed. It  is an expression 
as imaginary as the value of the earth.109
As a value-creating substance which is itself without value, labor 
is abstract homogeneous productive activity110 of man, or his cre­
ative effort which is unfolded as he opposes himself to nature.111 
In other words “ labor” is a process the genetic unfolding of which 
is expressed in the material products whereby life is sustained. 
These products are means of production, on the one hand, and 
means of subsistence on the other. Both the means of production 
and the means of subsistence are but the phenomenal expressions 
of labor, varying with each historical epoch while labor is itself 
constant. Labor “ is a necessary condition,” says Marx, “ inde­
pendent of all forms of society, for the existence of the human 
race; it is an eternal, nature-imposed necessity, without which 
there can be no material exchanges between man and Nature, and 
therefore no life.” 112 Although the class struggle does revolve 
around the material means of life (means of production and means 
of subsistence), the latter cannot be said to determine class strug­
gle in any absolute sense. They are the phenomenal forms taken 
by abstract and non-valuable labor. In the absolute sense class 
struggle should be understood as the struggle of labor, the “ prin­
ciple of life,” for self-realization. In seeking, therefore, to possess 
the means of production, the proletariat as the expression of labor 
in the real world is moved not so much by the desire to enhance its
109 Capital, I, 588.
110 “ Productive activity/’ Marx explains, “ if we leave out of sight its special 
form, viz., the useful character of the labour, is nothing but the expenditure of human 
labour-power. Tailoring and weaving, though qualitatively different productive 
activities, are each a productive expenditure of human brains, nerves, and muscles, 
and in this sense are human labour. They are but two different modes of expending 
human labour-power. Of course, this labour-power, which remains the same under all 
its modifications, must have attained a certain pitch of development before it can be ex­
pended in a multiplicity of modes.”  Ibid., p. 51. (Italics mine.)
111 Ibid., p. 197. 112 Ibid., p. 50.
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material welfare as to establish the moral and political authority 
of labor. The proletariat comes to see the class struggle as a con­
test for social power and political supremacy.113
This interpretation of class struggle runs counter to the ortho­
dox conception of it. According to the latter, used as a matter of 
fact by Veblen in one of his criticisms of Marx, the proletariat 
seeks to gain possession of the means of production merely to af­
fect the distribution of income. Inasmuch as income is under­
stood in terms of the valuation of goods as units of subsistence, 
class struggle is resolved into a struggle for the physical needs of 
life. It would be foolish of us to attempt to deny the emphasis 
which Marx placed upon the “physical exploitation” of labor in 
his “ theory of increasing misery.” But we think it can be shown 
that Marx’s main purpose in developing this theory was not to re­
veal the increasing material discomfort of labor in a capitalist 
economy, but its declining “ social satisfactions” and its moral and 
political subordination.
In his theory of wages, Marx bases the proletariat’s income on 
the “ cost of the laborer’s subsistence and propagation.” 114 The 
critics of Marx’s theory of increasing misery have usually over­
looked the fact that his subsistence wages have two levels. One of 
these levels is “physical” and the other is “ moral” or “ historical.” 
Marx states:
If  the owner of labour-power works to-day, to-morrow he must again be 
able to repeat the same process in the same conditions as regards health and 
strength. His means of subsistence must therefore be sufficient to maintain 
him in his normal state as a labouring individual. His natural wants, such 
as food, clothing, fuel, and housing, vary  according to the clim atic and other 
physical conditions of his country. On the other hand, the number and
113 The class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the feudal lords was as much a 
struggle for “ social power and prerogatives” as for economic (material) dominance. 
“ The industrial capitalists,” says Marx, “ these new potentates, had on their part 
not only to displace the guild masters of handicrafts, but also the feudal lords, the 
possessors of the sources of wealth. In this respect their conquest of social power 
appears as the fruit of a victorious struggle both against feudal lordship and its revolting 
prerogatives, and against the guilds and the fetters they laid on the free development 
of production and the free exploitation of man by man.” Ibid., pp. 786-87. (Italics 
mine.)
“ 4 Marx, “ Wage-Labor and Capital,” in Lee, op. cit.f p. 92.
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extent of his so-called necessary wants, as also the modes of satisfying them, 
are themselves the product of historical development, and depend therefore 
to a great extent on the degree of civilisation of a country, more particularly 
on the conditions under which, and consequently on the habits and the de­
gree of comfort in wdiich, the class of free labourers has been formed. In 
contradistinction therefore to the case of other commodities, there enters into 
the determination of the value of labour-power a historical and moral ele­
m ent.115
While according to Marx the natural tendency of capitalism is to 
drive wages to the level of “ physical” subsistence, the aim of the 
workers, organized in political parties and trade unions, is to resist 
this downward trend and to achieve the cultural and social ad­
vantages that come with higher wages. The extent to which the 
workers’ pressure for higher wages can be realized is seriously 
limited under capitalism, Marx contends. These limitations re­
veal to the proletariat capitalism’s inability fully to satisfy the 
higher wants of the laboring masses and confirm its belief in the 
practical necessity of revolution.
But if, as Marx seems to admit, the proletariat can obtain 
something more than physical subsistence under capitalism how 
can he deny the possibility of the proletariat improving its mate­
rial position under capitalism? He does not deny this possibility. 
For example, he admits that money wages, or the more important 
real wages might rise, thereby bettering the proletariat’s physical 
well-being. Y et he does insist that the relative wages must in­
evitably decline, or at any rate, relative wages can only increase 
at the expense of profits. Marx explains this depreciation and ap­
preciation of wages on the three following levels:
(1) T he real wage expresses the price of labor in relation to the price of 
other commodities; the relative wage, on the contrary, expresses the pro­
portionate share which living labor gets of the new values created by it as com­
pared to that which is appropriated by stored-up labor or capital.II6
(2) . . . .  Real wages m ay remain the same, or they m ay even rise, and 
yet relative wages m ay none the less have fallen.“ 7
(3) R elative wages m ay decline, although the real wages rise together 
with nominal wages, or the m oney price of labor; if only it does not rise in 
the same proportion as profit. For instance, if when trade is good, wages
115 Capital, I, 190. Also “ Value, Price, and Profit,” in Lee, op. cit.y p. 164.
116 Lee, op. cit.y p. 100. 117 Ibid., p. 101.
74 A B R A M  L . H A R R IS
rise five per cent., and profits on the other hand thirty per cent., then the 
proportional or relative wage has not increased but declined.118
We are not concerned here with the statistical accuracy of 
Marx’s theory of distribution but rather with the bearing of this 
theory upon the conception of wants underlying his theories of 
increasing misery and class struggle. In brief we are not inter­
ested in whether history has confirmed Marx’s prediction of an 
inevitable decline in the relative wages of the proletariat. What 
concerns us is whether he saw in this decline something besides the 
progressive worsening of proletarian physical well-being. This 
relative decline, it should be observed, is recognized by Marx as a 
cultural or social implication of a capitalistic economy.
A  notable advance in the amount paid as wages presupposes a rapid in­
crease of productive capital. The rapid increase of productive capital calls 
forth just as rapid an increase in wealth, luxury, social wants, and social com­
forts. Therefore, although the comforts of the laborer have risen, the social 
satisfaction which they give has fallen in comparison with these augmented 
comforts of the capitalist, which are unattainable for the laborer, and in 
comparison with the scale of general development society has reached. Our 
wants and their satisfaction have their origin in society; we therefore measure 
them in their relation to society, and not in relation to the objects which 
satisfy them. Since their nature is social, it is therefore relative.119
If, as Marx contends, the decline in relative wages gauges the 
growing disparity between the “ social satisfaction” of the prole­
tariat as over against that of the capitalists, relative wages must 
be taken to measure something other than the progressive physi­
cal misery of the proletariat. In consequence class struggle is to be 
approached from a different standpoint from that of physical or 
material necessities. This different standpoint, we repeat, is the 
moral or ethical significance of labor to be further observed in 
Marx’s consideration of nominal and real wages.
He maintains that while nominal or money wages may increase 
with a corresponding improvement in the proletariat’s material 
circumstances, they can do so only on one condition, the rapid 
accumulation of capital. He states:
When capital is increasing fast, wages may rise, but the profit of capital will 
rise much faster. The material position of the laborer has improved, but it is
118 Ibid., p. 103. 119 Ibid., p. 98.
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at the expense of his social position. T he social gulf which separates him from 
the capitalist has widened. Finally, the meaning of the most favorable condi­
tion of wage-labor— that is, the quickest possible increase of productive capital 
— is merely th is: T he faster the working classes enlarge and extend the hostile 
power that dominates over them, the better will be the conditions under 
which they will be allowed to labor for the further increase of bourgeois 
wealth and for the wider extension of the power of capital, and thus con­
tentedly to forge for themselves the golden chains by  which the bourgeoisie 
drags them in its train.120
In other words, an increasing accumulation of capital, although 
inevitably accompanied by a decline in relative wages, does not 
necessarily produce a corresponding decline in money or real 
wages. Thus, while the increasing accumulation of capital cannot 
be said to condemn the proletariat to abject physical misery, it 
does enforce a bondage which is just as degrading as poverty. 
Capital originates in the “ labour process” only as means of pro­
duction and subsistence, but under the institution of private 
property it becomes the means of divorcing labor from its prod­
ucts and expropriating it from the means of production. The pro­
gressive accumulation of capital and its concentration in private 
hands therefore increases the dependence of the proletariat upon 
ownership; s u b o r d i n a t e s  I f bor^to its own products; and increases 
the “power of stored-up labor over living labor.” 121 This subor­
dination of labor in material production is reflected ideologically, 
that is, reflected in the realm of politics, law, morals, and ethics. 
For since it is the ownership of the products of labor that deter­
mines political power and social esteem, the accumulation of cap­
ital deprives labor of social power and degrades it in the eyes of 
those who perform it, as well as in the eyes of those who buy it. 
Whatever the material comforts of the proletariat may be in a 
capitalist economy, the subordination of labor to the moral and 
political prerogatives of ownership increases with the accumula­
tion of capita], which means the “ increase of dominion of the 
bourgeoisie over the laboring class.” 122
. . . .  W ithin the capitalist system  all methods for raising the social pro­
ductiveness of labour are brought about at the cost of the individual la-
120 Ibid., pp. 103-4. 121 Ibid., p. 97. 122 Ibid.
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bourer; all means for the development of production transform themselves 
into means of domination over, and exploitation of, the producers; they m uti­
late the labourer into a fragment of a man, degrade him to the level of an 
appendage of a machine, destroy every remnant of charm in his work and 
turn it into a hated toil; they estrange from him the intellectual potentiali­
ties of the labour-process in the same proportion as science is incorporated 
in it as an independent power; they distort the conditions under which he 
works, subject him during the labour-process to a despotism the more hate­
ful for its meanness...........It  follows therefore that in proportion as capital
accumulates, the lot of the labourer, be his paym ent high or low, must grow 
worse.123
The conclusion seems inescapable that the progressive degrada­
tion of proletarian status upon which Marx persistently focuses 
attention is nothing less than the “ subordination of labor to the 
capitalist mode of production.” 124 And since the “ life-process of 
society” is maintained only through the expenditure of labor, the 
subordination of labor to the process of production is the degra­
dation of life itself. Hence, in final analysis, class struggle is the 
attempt of labor to emancipate itself from moral and political sub­
jection which the private ownership of its products makes possible 
thereby exalting itself to a position of social power consonant with 
its historical and metaphysical function.
This finally brings us to the relationship between “ class strug­
gle” and “ struggle for existence.” Underlying each of these con­
cepts is the idea that the “ survival” value of economic arrange­
ments resides in their efficiency in preserving the life of various 
members of the group. Life is not understood in either instance 
merely in the sense of a biological or physiological datum, al­
though Marx develops it metaphysically and Veblen attempts to 
explain it empirically. As has been previously stated, Marx, in 
reasoning from Hegelian premises, made the class struggle revolve 
about abstract labor or the material life of man as the absolute
123 Capital, I, 708-9.
124 ‘ ‘Fanatically bent on making value expand itself, he (the capitalist) ruthlessly 
forces the human race to produce for production’s sake; he thus forces the develop­
ment of the productive powers of society, and creates those material conditions? 
which alone can form the real basis of a higher form of society, a society in which 
the full and free development of every individual forms the ruling principle.”  Ibid., 
p. 649. (Italics mine.)
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which the historical process tends to realize. Metaphysically, la­
bor is co-equal with life.125 In this Marxian scheme of evolution, 
“ fulness of life” will be achieved when labor is no longer “ a means 
of life,” whose utility is measured by its cost of production (sub­
sistence wages), but is taken to be what it is, the co-equal of life. 
This co-equality the historical process seeks to realize. The meth­
od of realization is the dialectics of class struggle. The consumma­
tion is communism. But Veblen finds, on the basis of Darwinian 
postulates, that the “ life” of man in society unfolds itself largely 
as “ habit.” For him there can therefore be no invariant or abso­
lute principle on which “ fulness of life” can be decided prior to 
experience. “ Fulness of life” is simply what men are constrained 
by “ habit” to believe life ought to he. And what life ought to he is 
decided by the consumptive habits or the accustomed standard of 
living of various members of the group. Although Veblen adopts 
no absolute standard of “ fulness of life,” the concept involves him 
in a glaring inconsistency which is not found in Marx whatever 
other illogicalities the latter may be accused of.
To base “ fulness of life” upon standard of living as Veblen does 
is after all to base it upon “ income,” whether we measure income 
in physical or value units. But if, as we noted above, the con­
scious end of human beings in the “ struggle for existence” is “ ful­
ness of life,” and if “ fulness of life” is estimated by income, as it 
must to make economic sense, Veblen’s “ struggle for existence” 
stripped of verbiage is nothing more than a struggle for income. 
Now if the “ struggle for existence” is a struggle for income, the 
driving force in Veblen’s theory of change must be the distribution 
of income rather than occupational disciplines. This contradic­
tion is best seen in his ideas on the decline of capitalism.
He attributed this decline to the conflicting occupational habits 
of the technicians, engineers, and industrial workers, on the one 
side, and the business, financial, or non-industrial classes on the 
other. Habituated to workmanship, the technical classes become 
impatient of the “ systematic retardation and derangement of pro-
I2s “ Man himself, viewed as the impersonation of labour-power, is a natural 
object, a thing, although a living conscious thing, and labour is the manifestation 
of this power residing in him.” Ibid., p. 225.
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ductive industry’7 by business men whose paramount concern in 
production is private profit. Now if the technical classes come to 
dispossess the business classes of their control and ownership of 
industry as Veblen predicts and hopes, it seems that they will do 
so because the inefficiency of the industrial system under business 
management is revolting to their habits of technological efficiency. 
But surely Veblen does not think that industry is to be thus taken 
over merely for the sake of permitting engineers to give free rein 
to their efficiency. Even if the desire for efficiency per se were the 
motive whereby the technical class will be brought to act against 
the business interests, it is utterly impossible to conceive of any 
revolutionary frame of mind being kindled among the populace, 
without whose aid such a change would be improbable, with the 
shibboleth of industrial efficiency. If we can rely upon the history 
of revolutions for guidance respecting the motives to change,126 it 
seems that it is only when the populace envisages inefficiency as 
impaired income or standard of living that they can be counted on 
to furnish the mass power necessary to any revolution. And it is 
to the distribution of income, not occupational discipline of the 
technical classes, that Veblen finally resorts for his incentives to 
change. Thus he states:
Under these circumstances it seems reasonable to expect that the syste­
m atic retardation and derangement of productive industry which is entailed 
b y  the current business-like management will work out in a progressive 
abatem ent of the margin of net output of the industrial system at large; that 
this progressive abatem ent of the net industrial output will presently reach 
and pass the critical point of no net return— as counted in physical units of 
livelihood; and that in the calculable future the industrial system, so man­
aged on sound business principles, will run on lines of a progressively 
“ diminishing return,”  converging to an eventual limit of tolerance in the 
w ay of a reduced subsistence minimum...........I2?
The mass discontent which is likely to result from this “ techno­
logical deficit” he portrays as follows:
In the long run, so soon as the privation and chronic derangement which 
follows from this application of business principles has grown unduly irk­
some and becomes intolerable, there is due to come a sentimental revulsion
126 See Lyford P. Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution (Chicago, 1927).
127 Absentee Ownership, pp. 421-22.
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and a m uttering protest that “ something will have to be done about it ,”  as, 
e.g., in the case which has arisen in the coal industry.128 . . . .  There is al­
w ays the chance, more or less imminent, that in time, after due trial and 
error, on duly prolonged and intensified irritation, some sizable element of 
the underlying population, not intrinsically committed to absentee owner­
ship, will forsake or forget their moral principles of business-as-usual, and 
will thereupon endeavor to take this businesslike arrangement to pieces and 
put the works together again on some other plan, for better or worse.129
In final analysis, then, it is not conflicting habits arising from 
different occupational disciplines but income which furnishes the 
motive to change in Veblen’s theory of economic evolution. For 
while his “ technological deficit” is accounted in physical rather 
than value units, it affects the economic satisfactions of the under­
lying population in much the same way that “ increasing misery” 
does the proletariat in the Marxian scheme. From this it seems 
legitimate to observe that, despite his adoption of scientific postu­
lates, Veblen is no more successful than Marx in formulating a 
scientific and objective explanation of history— assuming, of 
course, that such an explanation is possible. Like Marx he sought 
to develop certain standards for evaluating economic practices 
under current institutions. Unlike Marx his social judgments lack 
the political passion which impels men upon the adoption of them 
to seek their realization through concerted action against the 
established order.
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